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Lapides v. Board of Regents and the 
Untrustworthiness of Unanimous 
Supreme Court Decisions 
PAUL HORTON* 
A former judge’s yearning for consensus on the United States 
Supreme Court resonates pleasantly with most of us most of the time. 
   The United States Supreme Court has seriously misled the public as to the 
function of a judge.  Despite the textbook model of a democracy, democratic 
institutions strive not for majorities but for consensus and, if possible, for 
unanimity. . . . 
   . . . The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, regularly decides 
cases by votes of five to four and, worse, three to two to four.  Instability in the 
law, and even chaos in the streets, is often the result.1 
His hyperbole aside, all of us can bring quickly to mind an abundance of 
fractured Supreme Court decisions that support the judge’s accusations.  
Supreme Court unanimity, however, sometimes comes at a big price.  
Getting to consensus often requires compromise, and compromise 
typically entails sacrifices of the kind of rationality and precision we 
associate with argument from rule or principle.  Supposedly the Supreme 
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.  This article draws 
inspiration from Ryan Saunders’ project—a mock Lapides opinion—for Adjudication 
Seminar in Spring 2003.  I am deeply indebted to Alicia Mead, my research assistant of 
the illustrious 50th Anniversary Class, not just for her many contributions, but also for 
her devotion to this project. 
 1. Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Everything You Always Wanted to Know About 
Judges but Were Afraid to Ask, 49 S.C. L. REV. 343, 345–46 (1998).  For chaos in the 
streets, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fractured decisions), and progeny.  But 
for maybe more chaos in the streets, see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(unanimous decision). 
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Court deals with weighty issues framed in heated controversy, often with 
splits between whole circuits over how these issues ought to be resolved; 
one might guess that if consensus has not already been reached below, 
then consensus will not be reached above if the High Court is doing its 
job.  And thus, we just might be entitled to suspect that a nice, clean 
unanimous Supreme Court decision sometimes, at least sometimes, 
indicates that someone up there was asleep at the switch. 
Take the Court’s recent Eleventh Amendment decisions for example.  
Unanimity, while not completely unknown, did not characterize the 
Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence between 1985 and 2000, 
and, more often than not, the Court’s Eleventh Amendment decisions 
revealed deep splits.2  Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment has figured one 
way or another in a large number of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
during the last century or so, but only a handful of them were 
unanimous.3  I have heard that some Constitutional Law teachers avoid 
the Eleventh Amendment in their courses, waiting patiently for its 
doctrine to settle down.  After two decades of hard-fought, inch-by-inch 
progress, mostly in the direction of clarifying the relationship between 
the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrines associated with State 
Sovereign Immunity, the Rehnquist Court has again opted for disarray.  
Like other unanimous Eleventh Amendment decisions, the Court’s 2002 
 
 2. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (7–2 decision); Vt. Agency of 
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) (6–1–2 decision); 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (5 with respect to Parts I, II, and IV of 
the Court’s opinion, 7 with respect to Part III, 4 dissenting with respect to Parts I, II, and 
IV, and a different 2 dissenting with respect to Part III); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999) (5–4 decision); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666 (1999) (5–4 decision); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (5–4 decision), aff’d, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); 
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998) (unanimous decision); Idaho 
v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (5–4 decision); Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997) (unanimous decision); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44 (1996) (5–4 decision); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 
(1994) (5–4); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (unanimous decision, except Thomas, 
J., who took no part); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (6–3 
decision); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 
(1990) (unanimous decision); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 
(1989) (4–1–4 decision); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (5–3 decision); 
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (5–4 decision); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of 
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (4–1–4 decision); Papasan v. Allain, 478 
U.S. 265 (1986) (2–4–3 decision); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (5–4 decision); 
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (5–4 decision). 
 3. See, e.g., Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899 (2004); Lapides v. Bd. 
of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002); Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 491; Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 519 U.S. at 425; Hafer, 502 U.S. at 21; McKesson Corp., 496 U.S. at 18; 
Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 
436 (1883); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883). 
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Lapides decision4 resonates more like a fist on the keys than a major 
ninth. 
1.  The Eleventh surely must be counted among the most straightforward 
and elegant of our Constitution’s Amendments:  
   The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.5   
Anyone with passing familiarity with the Constitution’s text knows 
where to look for the meaning of “judicial power.”  Article III makes it 
pretty clear that the federal courts hold the judicial power of the United 
States.  The most pertinent passages in Article III section 2 provide: 
   The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority; . . . to Controversies . . . between a State 
and Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.6 
One needs neither more information nor much common sense to 
conclude that these passages in Article III gave federal courts 
jurisdiction over lawsuits between a State and folks who were not that 
State’s citizens, that something led people in high places to realize that 
doing so was wrong, and that the Eleventh Amendment removed from 
“the Judicial power of the United States” jurisdiction over lawsuits 
commenced against a State by a noncitizen of that State.  Such a little, 
but likely important, change. 
2.  The textualism produced by the innocent combination of a little 
knowledge with common sense sometimes is a dangerous thing.  
Sometimes the tendency simply to read and react to canonical text leads 
one to overlook plausible alternative interpretations.  But what is there to 
interpret in the Eleventh Amendment?  And when we add the most 
easily accessible historical context—Chisholm v. Georgia7—to what we 
have so far, what we have so far seems comfortably confirmed. 
Chisholm involved a diversity lawsuit commenced in the United States 
Supreme Court in 1792, a scant handful of years after the Constitution 
 
 4. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 613. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 6. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 7. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
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became the United States Constitution, by some South Carolina creditors 
seeking a money judgment against their debtor, the State of Georgia.  
Georgia refused to appear or otherwise submit to the Court’s jurisdiction 
to entertain the suit.  The plaintiffs, through the United States Attorney 
General, sought a writ to compel the State’s appearance and answer 
under threat of default judgment.8  Of the Court’s five Justices, four—two 
of whom had been members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 
and another of whom had participated with Hamilton and Madison in 
authoring the Federalist Papers—supported the issuance of the writ in 
opinions that, however wide-ranging, rested on the text of Article III.9 
Justice Iredell, the lone Chisholm dissenter, avoided the Constitution’s 
text.  In his view, Article III articulated the theoretical boundaries of the 
federal judicial power.  But legislation was required to grant the 
authority and means to enable that power, and Congress had refrained 
from touching State sovereign immunity—an immunity that, to Justice 
Iredell, preexisted the Constitution and remained after its ratification—in 
the pertinent enablement.10 
The United States’ response to Chisholm was swift and meaningful.  
The first bill proposing the Eleventh Amendment was introduced in 
Congress two days after the decision was filed.  Congress enacted its 
final proposal, looking much like the first, in March 1794.  A year later, 
enough States ratified it. President Adams, however, did not announce 
its ratification until January 1798.11  In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 
another diversity lawsuit filed in the Supreme Court, the Court 
effectively bowed to the new text and to the popular will behind it in a 
per curiam decision filed February 14, 1798: 
   THE COURT, on the day succeeding the argument, delivered a unanimous 
opinion, that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not be 
exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state was sued 
by the citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.12 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. The five opinions in Chisholm were authored by Justices Iredell, Blair, Wilson, 
Cushing, and by Chief Justice Jay. 
 10. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting); see also CLYDE E. JACOBS, 
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 39–42 (1972) (arguing that 
although the First Congress understood that States would be suable in federal court, it 
failed to pass the necessary provisions in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to effectuate this 
understanding). 
 11. For a good history of the trip the Eleventh Amendment took from its 
introduction as a bill to ratification by the States, see the briefs in In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 
443, 462–64 (1887), and Justice Kennedy’s more complete historical account in Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–27 (1999). 
 12. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 382 (1798). 
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The Court then extended its declaration of no federal judicial power over 
actions brought against a State by a noncitizen of that State nunc pro 
tunc at least as far back as Chisholm.13  Thus, by the end of the 
eighteenth century, the Eleventh Amendment had been entered into the 
Constitution and had been put to bed with the Supreme Court’s 
definitive holding that it meant just what it said.  Hollingsworth has 
never explicitly been overruled. 
3.  Maybe a little interpretation is needed after all.  We know that U.S. 
adjudication is divided into federal and state systems.  We also know 
that the Eleventh Amendment blockades the use of federal courts for the 
commencement and prosecution of suits against a State by noncitizens of 
that State.  The question becomes which suits—all of them or just some 
of them? 
Federal courts do not possess general original jurisdiction.  Article III 
of the Constitution specifies the grounds for original jurisdiction, and 
divides the world of federal civil trial adjudication into two general 
parts: diversity/alienage and federal question.  We know that the 
Eleventh Amendment speaks to this Article III original jurisdiction. We 
also know that the Eleventh Amendment, unlike Article III, says nothing 
about States as the commencers and prosecutors.  We are dealing, then, 
with suits brought by individuals as plaintiffs against States as defendants. 
From here on out, I will use “Citizen” to refer to an individual civil 
litigant against a State who is a citizen of that State, and I will use 
“Noncitizen” to refer to an individual civil litigant against a State who is 
not a citizen of that State.  Litigants can commence and prosecute their 
claims against States in eight basic configurations, six of which 
implicate the Article III federal judicial power: 
Citizens with claims against their own State might commence and 
prosecute them (1) in federal court (federal claims); (2) in federal 
court (state claims); (3) in state court (federal claims); (4) in state 
court (state claims).   
Noncitizens with claims against States might commence and 
prosecute them (5) in federal court (federal claims); (6) in federal 
court (state claims; diversity or alienage jurisdiction); (7) in state 
court (federal claims); (8) in state court (state claims). 
 
 13. The Court had held the writ issued in Chisholm in abeyance pending the 
proceedings that led to the Eleventh Amendment.  Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 480 n.*. 





We know that Article III’s provisions on original-jurisdiction do not 
recognize configuration (2), and do not reach configuration (4), even by 
implication.  We know that the text of the Eleventh Amendment specifically 
excludes configuration (6). We also know that the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment does not deal with configurations (1), (3), (7), and (8).  That 
leaves us with configuration (5)—Noncitizen brings federal question 
claim against State in federal court—to worry about so far as the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment is concerned. 
The argument for including configuration (5) within the Eleventh 
Amendment’s exclusion from federal judicial power is that the 
Amendment’s text refers to “any suit in law or equity,” a phrase that 
seems to include federal question suits as well as diversity suits.  If that 
is what the Eleventh Amendment says, then Noncitizen must commence 
his or her federal question suit in state court.  The argument for 
excluding configuration (5) from the Eleventh Amendment’s exclusion 
regards the text of Article III as contributing to the meaning of the 
Amendment.  Aside from the partial phrase “law and equity,” which 
echoes the same partial phrase in Article III’s “federal question” 
provision, the text of the Eleventh Amendment seems to target the two 
Article III provisions alluding to diversity/alienage civil actions 
involving States and Noncitizens. 
We are faced, then, with a question of interpretation for which 
assistance outside the Eleventh Amendment’s text will prove necessary.  
Hollingsworth may have answered that question, one month after the 
Eleventh Amendment became official constitutional text.  However, 
Hollingsworth, like Chisholm, was a diversity case, not a federal 
question case.  The narrowest legitimate interpretation will be that the 
Eleventh Amendment eliminates diversity lawsuits commenced by 
Noncitizens against States from the original jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.  The broadest legitimate interpretation will be that the Eleventh 
Amendment eliminates diversity lawsuits and federal question lawsuits 
commenced by Noncitizens against States from the original jurisdiction 
of the federal courts. 
The broadest interpretation seems clearly assumed by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Osborn v. President, Directors & Co. of Bank of the United 
States,14 the first Supreme Court decision holding that a plaintiff with a 
federal claim could avoid the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh 
Amendment by suing State officers and not the State itself, over a 
 
 14. Osborn v. President, Directors & Co. of the Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
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dissent by Justice Johnson that no federal question was actually 
involved.  The Reconstruction Court, while confronting a large number 
of actions claiming that Southern States were unconstitutionally 
outmaneuvering their creditors by impairing the obligations of their own 
contracts, solidified the broad interpretation.15  And, when asked to 
revisit the old issue (mostly by its dissenters), the Rehnquist Court 
seems tentatively to have mustered a bare majority willing to adopt the 
broad, includes-federal question construction of the Amendment’s 
terms.16 
I confess here to wishing that Chief Justice Marshall, writing a mere 
thirty years after Chisholm, was wrong.  As I read the Eleventh 
Amendment’s text, limitation of the Amendment to diversity cases 
harmonizes with my intuition, while expanding the limitation to include 
federal question cases seems grating and dissonant.17  Others’ reactions 
to the Eleventh Amendment’s text in the shadow of Article III may 
differ from mine.  I think the broadest legitimate interpretation creates 
problems for the resolution of a few federal question claims that are 
eliminated or made less difficult under the narrowest legitimate 
interpretation.18  I am guessing, on the other hand, that the broadest 
 
 15. “That a State cannot be sued by a citizen of another State, or of a foreign state, 
on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, is clearly established by the decisions of this court in several recent 
cases.”  Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). 
 16. This construction of the Eleventh Amendment was presaged by Justice 
Powell’s plurality opinion in Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 
U.S. 468, 476–88 (1987), an opinion that should not have used, and did not need, the 
Eleventh Amendment to make this point.  See id. at 488–93; see, e.g., Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 743 (2002) (5–4 holding that Federal 
Maritime Commission is barred from adjudicating private complaints against states); 
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687–88 
n.5 (1999) (the 5–4 majority dismissed Justice Breyer’s attempt to revisit the issue of the 
Eleventh Amendment’s coverage of federal question jurisdiction); cf. Idaho v. Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (5–4 decision holding that Indian tribes are generally 
barred from suing States in federal court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) 
(5–4 decision holding that Congress could not abrogate States’ immunity under the 
Indian Commerce Clause). 
 17. Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently shares my intuitive reaction to the text: 
“[T]he text of the [Eleventh] Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts . . . .”  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54. 
 18. By “a few federal claims” I mean those federal question claims, these days few 
in number, that are brought by Noncitizens against States rather than by Citizens against 
States.  Justice Kennedy appears to concur with my cost-benefit analysis of the broad 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to include federal question claims: 
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legitimate interpretation requires federal courts to worry less than would 
be necessary under the narrowest legitimate interpretation about their 
jurisdiction over lawsuits involving a mix of federal question and 
diversity claims.  Others may not care much about these problems, or 
may think they have solutions for them that do not offend the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
At present, however, I am not concerned about the resolution of the 
question of how the Eleventh Amendment is to be interpreted.  Of 
course, whether you fall on the narrow side or on the broad side of the 
answer to this question of interpretation, I hope you agree with my 
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment’s text.  I am only concerned 
that you recognize my position that the Eleventh Amendment must be 
understood to remove from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts 
either some or all of the civil lawsuits that Article III authorizes 
Noncitizens to bring against States. 
4.  The Eleventh Amendment has provided the ground for many pitched 
Supreme Court battles, and one easily gets sidetracked while engaged in 
criticism.  Having come this far, let me clarify what I am not criticizing 
here. 
My argument has nothing to do with how to tell whether a Noncitizen 
is commencing or prosecuting an action against a State.  Early in the 
Nation’s history, Chief Justice Marshall tested the Eleventh Amendment 
simply by looking at the named parties.19  The Reconstruction Court 
revisited his test and searched seriously (to the State’s benefit) for real 
 
Neither in theory nor in practice has it been shown problematic to have federal 
claims resolved in state courts where Eleventh Amendment immunity would 
be applicable in federal court but for an exception based on Young.  For 
purposes of the Supremacy Clause, it is simply irrelevant whether the claim is 
brought in state or federal court.  Federal courts, after all, did not have general 
federal-question jurisdiction until 1875.  Assuming the availability of a state 
forum with the authority and procedures adequate for the effective vindication 
of federal law, due process concerns would not be implicated by having state 
tribunals resolve federal-question cases. 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 274–75 (Kennedy, J., for a Court plurality). 
 19. Marshall’s most widely quoted statement to this effect comes from Osborn: 
[T]he 11th amendment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the constitution 
over suits against states, is, of necessity, limited to those suits in which a state 
is a party on the record. 
   The state not being a party on the record, and the court having jurisdiction 
over those who are parties on the record, the true question is, not one of 
jurisdiction, but whether, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the court ought to 
make a decree against the defendants; whether they are to be considered as 
having a real interest, or as being only nominal parties. 
Osborn, 22 U.S. at 857–58; see also United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 139–
40 (1809) (treating the named party as the real defendant despite the State’s significant 
interest in the outcome). 
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parties in interest20 until its successor Court settled the test in Ex parte 
Young.21  I like Chief Justice Marshall’s test, better than the later ones, 
but that is not why I am complaining here. 
My argument has nothing to do with the old question whether the 
Eleventh Amendment reaches the appellate jurisdiction as well as the 
original jurisdiction of the federal courts.  In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief 
Justice Marshall answered this question by confining the Amendment’s 
constriction to the federal courts’ original jurisdiction.22  No serious 
effort to revisit his answer has ever been made, and I make none here. 
My argument has nothing to do with the controversy over whether 
Congress can make State courts of general jurisdiction entertain federal 
claims commenced or prosecuted by Citizens or Noncitizens against 
their State targets.23  It must be true that disabling Congress from 
exercising this option likely would prevent a few additional good claims 
from being asserted against States.  It also must be true that the 
overwhelming majority of federal claims by persons against States are 
commenced by Citizens, not Noncitizens, and thus are claims to which 
the Eleventh Amendment does not speak. 
My argument will not resolve the troublesome questions of just how 
and when a State can effectively consent to, withdraw consent to, or 
waive immunity from suit in federal court.  The Supreme Court has made a 
 
 20. Louisiana was the primary recipient of the Supreme Court’s largess.  See, e.g., 
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 89, 91 (1883) (New Hampshire was just a 
front for its citizens who were Louisiana’s creditors; original proceeding in Supreme 
Court dismissed); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 728 (1883) (holding that Louisiana 
officials were not subject to plaintiff’s mandamus action in federal court, because the suit 
against them for payment of debt from the public treasury was actually against the State); 
see also In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 462 (1887) (concluding that because the State of 
Virginia, not its Attorney General and Auditor, was the real party in interest in this suit 
for repayment of a debt, petitioners were discharged of the contempt citations entered 
against them issued by the federal circuit court). 
 21. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that state officials may be 
sued in federal court for injunctive relief to prevent violating federal law); see also 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74; Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 277; Blatchford v. 
Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779–86 (1991) (reaffirming the Young doctrine as 
an important safety valve, on the assumptions that (1) the Eleventh Amendment bars 
Noncitizens’ federal question claims, and that (2) Indian tribes on reservation lands 
within the State they are suing (or the State that is suing them) are nonetheless 
Noncitizens of that State). 
 22. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 415 (1821). 
 23. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding 5–4 that Congress cannot 
subject States to private civil actions in their own courts under the Fair Labor Standards 
Act). 
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shambles of answering these questions, and has significantly contributed 
to the shambles in the decision I am about to discuss.  My argument goes 
no further than to make these troublesome questions irrelevant in 
lawsuits that fall within the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. 
My argument will seem to require some defense against three 
problematic areas, at least two of which have some doctrine attached: (1) 
suits commenced in federal court by private parties against members to 
interstate compacts; (2) counterclaims and the like asserted by private 
parties against States that have initiated litigation against them in federal 
court; (3) congressional attempts to require States to consent to suit in 
federal court in return for federal benefits.  I will try to mention these 
areas again later in this article. 
I will be tempted to pay considerable and detailed attention to 
statements made in recent Supreme Court majority and plurality 
opinions that seem to contradict my argument.  I will resist that 
temptation by conceding that bad Supreme Court language contradicts 
me.  The results in these opinions do not.  Part of my project here will be 
to test how seriously the High Court intends this bad language. 
5.  What does Lapides v. Board of Regents24 have to do with the Eleventh 
Amendment?  The answer, so far, is nothing.  Paul Lapides—a Kennesaw 
State University instructor, doubtless a Georgia citizen, employed by 
Georgia’s state university system—brought a civil action in a proper 
Georgia Superior Court against a Georgia state agency and various 
Georgia state employees in their official and personal capacities, 
claiming violations of both Georgia state law and federal law.  The 
federal claims in the complaint privileged the defendants to remove 
Lapides’ action to federal court, and they did so.  Once there, the state 
agency moved to dismiss Lapides’ complaint against it.  The district 
court refused to dismiss the State from the suit, holding that its 
participation in the act of removal amounted to a waiver of its “Eleventh 
Amendment immunity” from suit in federal court.  The Court of Appeals 
reversed.  The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals.25  After 
noting that the District Court had dismissed the federal claims against 
the individual defendants, and that Lapides’ federal claim against the 
State was not a cognizable one,26 the Court held: 
 
 24. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613 (2002). 
 25. Id. at 624. 
 26. See id. at 616 (addressing claims against individual defendants); id. at 617 
(discussing a claim against State: “Lapides’ only federal claim against the State arises 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim seeks only monetary damages, and we have held that 
a State is not a ‘person’ against whom a § 1983 claim for money damages might be 
asserted.” (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989))). 
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   We conclude that the State’s action joining the removing of this case to 
federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity—though, as we have 
said, the District Court may well find that this case, now raising only state-law 
issues, should nonetheless be remanded to the state courts for determination.27 
Regardless of one’s reaction to this result, the wrong vehicle must 
have been carelessly chosen to reach it.  A unanimous Lapides Court 
held that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it 
removes to federal court a case brought by a Citizen (that is, one of the 
State’s own citizens) against it in state court (in this case, one of the 
State’s own courts).  If the Court actually means what it unanimously 
said, its opinion is wrong in nearly every traditional way known to 
constitutional jurisprudence: disregard of constitutional text; misuse (at 
least misreading) of precedents; avoidance of the narrow in favor of the 
sweeping; and indifference to likely consequences. 
6.  The doctrines associated with Sovereign Immunity—that a Sovereign 
is not amenable to suit without its consent—cover a much broader, yet 
also narrower, range than the text of the Eleventh Amendment.  I am not 
about to revive the argument Justice Wilson so eloquently expressed in 
Chisholm that States of the United States are not the “sovereigns” 
entitled to this sovereign immunity.28  I recognize, and forgive, the 
Court’s often mistaken use of “Eleventh Amendment” as a stand-in for 
the breadth of State Sovereign Immunity; that is to say, for the 
proposition that a sovereign is not amenable to suit.  A State “not 
amenable to suit” with respect to claims falling within the Eleventh 
Amendment’s text is a State not amenable to suit. 
The Lapides Court, like some Courts before it, carelessly cites Hans v. 
Louisiana29 for the proposition that Eleventh Amendment equals 
Sovereign Immunity.30  Hans held no such thing.  In Hans, Louisiana 
creditors, claiming unconstitutional impairment of contract, sued their 
debtor, the State of Louisiana, in a federal trial court over actions the 
State had taken to avoid these debts.  Louisiana moved to dismiss, 
asserting that “[p]laintiff cannot sue the state without its permission; the 
 
 27. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 624. 
 28. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454–58 (1793) (Wilson, J., 
concurring). 
 29. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 30. Indeed, Lapides begins dramatically with this erroneous assertion: “The 
Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of 
other States . . . and by its own citizens as well, Hans v. Louisiana . . . .”  Lapides, 535 
U.S. at 616. 
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constitution and laws do not give this honorable court jurisdiction of a 
suit against the state, and its jurisdiction is respectfully declined.”31  The 
trial court dismissed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.32 
The Hans creditors argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar 
their federal suit.  Of course they were correct on this point, and the 
Court confessed as much.33  But then the Hans Court turned away from 
the Eleventh Amendment toward what lay behind it—Chisholm v. 
Georgia, Hamilton’s Federalist 81, and Madison’s explanation of 
Article III during Virginia’s ratification convention—and held that the 
Chisholm dissenter was right that the Constitution, and specifically the 
terms of Article III, had been articulated against a law background that 
included State sovereign immunity: 
   The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and 
forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when 
establishing the judicial power of the United States. . . . 
   The suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the law.  
This has been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it 
is hardly necessary to be formally asserted.  It was fully shown by an exhaustive 
examination of the old law by Mr. Justice Iredell in his opinion in Chisholm v. 
Georgia; and it has been conceded in every case since, where the question has, 
in any way, been presented, even in the cases which have gone farthest in 
sustaining suits against the officers or agents of States.34 
In other words, Sovereign Immunity—that a State is not amenable to suit 
(including suit commenced in federal court) without its consent—and 
not the Eleventh Amendment was the Court’s basis for dismissing the 
Louisiana creditors’ suit in Hans.  Hans never said “Eleventh Amendment 
equals Sovereign Immunity.”  Hans said that State sovereign immunity 
was accommodated by implication in the original Constitution, 
independently of the Eleventh Amendment, and that the Chisholm 
majority was wrong to imagine otherwise. 
7.  Indeed, Chisholm’s rejection of State Sovereign Immunity furnishes 
the only reason—a false positive produced by coincidence—for 
conjoining Eleventh Amendment with that more general doctrine.  I 
would not bet against the notion that if the majority in Chisholm v. 
Georgia had joined instead of overridden Justice Iredell, then (1) the 
 
 31. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3. 
 32. Id. at 4, 21. 
 33. [T]he plaintiff in error contends that he, being a citizen of Louisiana, is not  
embarrassed by the obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment, inasmuch as that 
amendment only prohibits suits against a State which are brought by . . . subjects 
of a foreign State.  It is true, the amendment does so read: and if there were no 
other reason or ground for abating his suit, it might be maintainable . . . . 
Id. at 10. 
 34. Id. at 15–16. 
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Eleventh Amendment would never have come into being, and (2) to this 
day our federal Constitution, with its Article III intact, would be 
interpreted to assume State Sovereign Immunity with respect to suits 
between a State and its own citizens, citizens of other States, or citizens 
of foreign nations.  Claimant would bring suit against State in federal 
court.  The suit, if maintainable against another individual regardless of 
the latter’s consent, would also be maintainable against State if State 
consented to suit. 
I submit here to the general rule of Hans v. Louisiana as Hans 
expressed that rule.  Suppose you were on the Chisholm Court.  Or 
suppose you were the Hans Court asked to step into the shoes of the 
Chisholm Court.  You had interpreted a phrase in Article III to mean 
exactly what it said, over a vigorous dissent arguing for a pervasive 
constitutional background of State Sovereign Immunity.  Congress, 
followed by the States, had responded by passing a constitutional 
amendment that (among other things) had obliterated Chisholm’s precise 
holding as clearly as words could manage without mentioning names.  
How would you treat the resulting void?  I think that you have four 
options. 
(1)  You could admit your error in interpreting Article III the way 
you did in Chisholm.  Then you could ignore the new amendment’s 
text and say the amendment obliterated Chisholm in toto, restoring the 
field of State Sovereign Immunity to its preexisting condition, and 
nothing more. 
(2)  You could refuse to admit your error in interpreting Article III 
the way you did in Chisholm.  Then you could settle exclusively on the 
new amendment’s text and say it did nothing more than overrule the 
explicit holding in Chisholm—addressing only Noncitizens’ lawsuits 
against States brought in federal court—without touching the rest of 
your understanding of the U.S. Constitution’s effect on preexisting 
State Sovereign Immunity. 
(3)  You could refuse to admit your error in interpreting Article III 
the way you did in Chisholm.  Then you could ignore the amendment’s 
text and say the new amendment restored the field of State Sovereign 
Immunity to the condition it was in before Article III became effective. 
(4)  You could admit your error in interpreting Article III the way 
you did in Chisholm.  Then you could respect both the amendment’s text 
and the amendment’s immediate effect.  You could say the new 
amendment obliterated Chisholm in toto, restoring the field of State 
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Sovereign Immunity to its preexisting condition, except to the extent 
the terms of the amendment altered the preexisting condition. 
And, if you were just a little bit humble, and just a little bit respectful of 
the ability of other intelligent people to write things down on pieces of 
paper, you would choose the fourth of these options.  As I have noted 
previously, the Hans Court circumvented option (1).  The Hans Court 
clearly rejected option (2).35  Thanks to a perfunctory concurrence in 
which Justice Harlan must have chosen either option (2) or option (3),36 
we can say with comfort that the Hans Court selected option (4).  We 
might, in short, join the Supreme Court in its common post-Hans 
observation, so far as that observation concerns the general rule of State 
Sovereign Immunity: 
Although the text of the [Eleventh] Amendment would appear to restrict only 
the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, “we have understood 
the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition . . . which it confirms.”  That presupposition, first observed over 
a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana . . . has two parts: first, that each State is a 
sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that “‘[i]t is inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent.’”37 
8.  Submission to the general rule expressed in Hans fairly implies my 
willingness to admit a qualification or two not expressed in Hans.  For 
example, I am willing to admit that Congress, acting in pursuance of its 
constitutional authority, might be able to modify the breadth of State 
Sovereign Immunity.  I would be willing to admit, for example, that 
 
 35. It was argued by the opponents of the Constitution that this clause would  
authorize jurisdiction to be given to the federal courts to entertain suits against 
a State brought by the citizens of another State, or of a foreign state.  Adhering 
to the mere letter, it might be so; and so, in fact, the Supreme Court held in 
Chisholm v. Georgia; but looking at the subject as Hamilton did, and as Mr. 
Justice Iredell did, in the light of history and experience and the established 
order of things, the views of the latter were clearly right . . . . 
Id. at 13–14. 
 36. I cannot give my assent to many things said in the opinion.  The comments  
made upon the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia do not meet my approval.  
They are not necessary to the determination of the present case.  Besides, I am 
of opinion that the decision in that case was based upon a sound interpretation 
of the Constitution as that instrument then was. 
Id. at 21 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 37. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (internal citations omitted).  
To like effect, inviting our like acquiescence: “The Court’s unanimous [sic] decision in 
Hans . . . firmly established that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a broad 
constitutional principle of sovereign immunity.”  Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and 
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 486 (1987) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).  We may say 
“true” to this statement, if we wish, without conceding that the Eleventh Amendment 
also “embodies” the “without its consent” qualification of the sovereign-immunity 
principle.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54. 
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Congress can modify, even abrogate, this State Sovereign Immunity in 
the exercise of its Commerce power—a position rejected by a deeply 
divided Court in Seminole Tribe38 and again in College Savings Bank.39  
I would be willing to admit that Congress can modify or abrogate State 
Sovereign Immunity in the exercise of its power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment—a position assumed in many cases and explicitly taken by 
the Court (not without dissent) in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.40  I would be 
willing to admit that Congress could successfully insist that States must 
“consent” to waive their sovereign immunity in return for federal 
benefits—a position maintained articulately by the Court at least since 
South Dakota v. Dole.41  I would even be willing to admit that Congress 
can circumvent State Sovereign Immunity by authorizing suit on federal 
claims against States in their own courts—a position narrowly rejected 
by the Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine.42 
None of these qualifications on the Hans doctrine require further 
discussion here.  The Lapides decision neither takes up nor deals with 
any of them.  Instead, it deals with the “consent” element of the general 
doctrine, and it holds that a State waives its immunity from the 
maintenance of a suit against it in federal court by removing to that court 
a suit initiated against it (by one of its own Citizens) in its own State 
courts.43  Although quite a bit of vitriol has been spilled in recent years 
 
 38. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47. 
 39. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 682–83 (1999). 
 40. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
 41. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).  Dole holds that the federal 
Spending Power permits Congress to impose conditions on State receipt of federal 
benefits and funds as long as those conditions do not induce the States to engage in 
activities that would be unconstitutional.  Id. at 210–12.  The proposition apparently 
stems from Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591–98 (1937) (upholding the 
Social Security Act’s provisions that condition tax credits upon States’ adoption of 
employment laws as required by the Act).  If it wishes to require State waiver of 
sovereign immunity as a condition to participation in federal benefits programs, 
Congress must likely indicate this intent expressly and in some detail.  Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
 42. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).  Several if not all of these doctrinal 
subtopics ultimately require resolution of the question whether Sovereign Immunity is a 
constitutional or merely a common law principle.  If the former, Congress would be 
limited in attempting to alter State Sovereign Immunity in ways that otherwise would be 
available to Congress if the doctrine were only a common law principle.  Note, however, 
that the Eleventh Amendment is not a required component in the resolution of any of 
these subtopics. 
 43. See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the 
Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167 (2003) (arguing that the 
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over the “consent” element of the Sovereign Immunity doctrine—we 
would expect federal courts to fumble with a “consent” condition from 
time to time—none was reserved for this issue by our Supreme Court’s 
members in Lapides, and I have no problems with this version of its 
holding. 
Nor am I particularly roused by the Court-sanctioned observation that 
“we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for 
what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms . . . .”44  
“Standing for the presupposition” seems to me a rather different idea 
than “Eleventh Amendment equals the presupposition, nothing more and 
nothing less.”  And the Eleventh Amendment, I maintain, does not 
simply reinstate the general doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity.  The 
Eleventh Amendment also amends that doctrine with respect to the 
claims it covers. 
9.  As the complete statement of the doctrine suggests, Sovereign 
Immunity has nothing to do with a court’s “jurisdiction” in the usual 
sense.45  Thus, a claimant brings suit against State, alleging a claim that 
would be cognizable if brought against another citizen, in a federal court 
(or state court) having original jurisdiction to entertain the suit; State 
decides, by word or action, whether to consent to the suit; if State 
consents, then the suit proceeds; if State does not consent, then the State 
(successfully) moves for dismissal (although moving for summary 
judgment would be better) on grounds of Sovereign Immunity.46 
 
Supreme Court conflated two distinct notions of waiver—a state’s consent to suit, and 
the effect of state officers’ actions—in mid-twentieth century in cases dealing with 
Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment). 
 44. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).  This language 
was quoted verbatim in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996), Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999), aff’d, 
527 U.S. 666 (1999), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999), and Fed. Mar. Comm’n 
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002). 
 45. Cf. CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
7 (1972) (“For Blackstone . . . the doctrine of sovereign immunity was simply a way of 
stating that the king was not amenable to the jurisdiction of his own courts unless he 
assented to such jurisdiction.  However, the doctrine was not then understood as 
relieving the sovereign of his legal obligations . . . .”); Eric S. Johnson, Note, 
Unsheathing Alexander’s Sword: Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System 
of Georgia, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1051, 1061–62 (2002) (arguing that confusion 
surrounding Sovereign Immunity—which the author equates with the Eleventh 
Amendment—results from its treatment as a subject matter jurisdiction concept rather 
than as a personal jurisdiction concept). 
 46. See generally 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ITS 
DIVISIONS, AGENCIES, AND OFFICERS, §§ 1:1–1:4 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the traditional 
doctrine, its procedural nature, and nuances of each jurisdiction). 
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And here is where we find obvious divergence between the Eleventh 
Amendment and the Sovereign Immunity it presupposes.  The Eleventh 
Amendment’s text leaves no room for State consent to the suits falling 
within its express scope.  Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment is crafted, 
not as an “immunity,” but rather as a limitation on the scope of the 
federal judicial power.  According to the Eleventh Amendment’s text, 
the lawsuits falling within its scope belong, under no circumstances, in 
federal court; attempts to adjudicate them, with or without a State-
defendant’s consent, would be ultra vires.  Put differently, according to 
text, Eleventh Amendment does not equal Sovereign Immunity, and 
construing the Eleventh Amendment to equal Sovereign Immunity 
would extend the federal judicial power to the lawsuits the Amendment 
eliminates from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
That the Eleventh Amendment does not equal Sovereign Immunity 
seems easy enough to prove.  Start simply by comparing the official 
version of the Eleventh Amendment with one version of what it would 
say if it were expressed in terms of Sovereign Immunity: 
Official version: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 
“Sovereign Immunity” version: “The Judicial power of the United 
States shall extend to suits commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State, subject, however, to the State’s 
consent to suit in the courts of the United States.”47 
Then give a little credit to the intelligence of eighteenth century 
legislators.  That is, realize the likelihood that they would have used 
something like the latter phraseology, rather than the phraseology 
actually employed, if they had wanted the Eleventh Amendment to 
reinstate State Sovereign Immunity exactly the way it was before 
 
 47. Compare yet another hypothetical version of a “Sovereign Immunity Eleventh 
Amendment”: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to suits 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State, unless the State against which suit is 
commenced or prosecuted consents to suit in the courts of the United States.” (Perhaps 
you can begin to see why I like the hypothetical version in text better than other 
hypothetical versions). 
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Chisholm.48  Especially so, in the face of a Supreme Court that had just 
finished demonstrating the tendency to interpret the Constitution literally 
and in a way that aggrandized the federal government’s power. 
Now consider the following scenarios, each of which is staged in a 
vigilant federal district court acting with due regard to the constitutional 
boundaries of its jurisdiction. 
[1] Noncitizen of State brings a diversity lawsuit against State in 
federal district court.  Without waiting for further action by the 
parties, the district court immediately dismisses the lawsuit as lying 
outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts, citing the Eleventh 
Amendment as authority for mandatory, sua sponte dismissal.49 
[2] Citizen of State brings a federal question lawsuit in federal 
district court against State.  This lawsuit proceeds until State takes 
action (motion to dismiss, for example, or motion for summary 
judgment) that the court recognizes as an effective assertion of State’s 
Sovereign Immunity.50 
 
 48. The starting points for analysis of Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh 
Amendment’s bar are actually opposite to each other.  Immunity presupposes that 
judicial power is vested but then exempts the immune subject from the exercise of that 
power; hence, “[a]ny exemption from a duty, liability, or service of process; esp., such an 
exemption granted to a public official.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 752 (7th ed. 1999) 
(emphasis added).  The Eleventh Amendment insists that the judicial power is not vested 
(or no longer will be vested) with respect to the litigation types it covers, and then limits 
the authority of the federal government to extend the judicial power to reach those 
litigation types. 
 49. States of the United States are never mentioned as potential parties for 
purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction.  Diversity jurisdiction extends to civil actions 
“between (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of 
a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a 
State or of different States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).  Although Congress thought to 
define “corporation” as a citizen or party for diversity jurisdiction, Id. § 1332(c)(1), it 
defined “States” with no mention of them as parties, Id. § 1332(d).  Thus, without 
mention of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress has not enabled the original jurisdiction 
granted to district courts to authorize diversity suits involving the State as a party.  See 
also Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894): 
   A State is not a citizen.  And, under the Judiciary Acts of the United States, it 
is well settled that a suit between a State and a citizen . . . of another State is 
not between citizens of different States; and that the Circuit Court of the 
United States has no jurisdiction of it, unless it arises under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States. 
 50. Or, in the alternative, the federal district court waits until return of service is 
filed, then enters some sort of order proposing to dismiss the lawsuit in thirty days on 
grounds of State sovereign immunity, unless within that time the State appears in the action 
or otherwise manifests its consent to suit.  “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2004) (emphasis added).  Although original jurisdiction of federal questions 
has been vested in the federal district courts by act of Congress, the States may continue to 
exercise any available exemption—such as Sovereign Immunity—from federal suit.   
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[3] Noncitizen of State brings a federal question lawsuit in federal 
district court against State.  If the Eleventh Amendment abrogates 
federal original jurisdiction with respect to federal question claims, 
then the court follows the process indicated in [1] above.  If the 
Eleventh Amendment does not implicate federal original jurisdiction 
over federal question claims, then the court follows the process 
indicated in [2] above. 
[4] Noncitizen of State brings a lawsuit against State in that 
State’s courts (or, for that matter, in some other state’s courts), 
alleging nonfederal claims.  State removes the lawsuit to the federal 
district court that would have original diversity jurisdiction of a 
similar lawsuit if brought against a defendant who was not a State.  
Without waiting for further action by the parties, the district court 
immediately remands the lawsuit to the state court in which it 
originated and erases all record of the lawsuit from its calendar, 
because the lawsuit lies outside the original jurisdiction of the federal 
district courts—and hence, outside their removal jurisdiction—citing 
the Eleventh Amendment as authority for mandatory, sua sponte 
remand.51 
[5] Citizen of State brings a federal question lawsuit against State 
in that State’s courts.  State removes the lawsuit to the federal 
district court of the district in which the state lawsuit was 
commenced.  This lawsuit proceeds on the court’s removal calendar 
until State takes action (motion to dismiss, for example, or motion 
 
 51. To remove on grounds of diversity of citizenship, the federal district court to 
which removal is made must have the original jurisdiction of the civil action that it 
would have had if plaintiff had commenced the action in federal court rather than in state 
court.  28 U.S.C. 1441(a) (2000).  Federal district courts, however, do not have original 
jurisdiction over States in diversity actions, although they might in federal question 
actions.  Compare Postal Tel. Cable Co., 155 U.S. at 487 (stating that no district court 
has original jurisdiction over States in diversity cases), with Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 
449, 462–63 (1884) (allowing removal of a federal question claim brought by the State 
against its own citizen in state court).  See also Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. 
Schacht, 524 U.S. 389–90 (1998) (citations omitted): 
Where original jurisdiction rests upon Congress’ statutory grant of “diversity 
jurisdiction,” this Court has held that one claim against one nondiverse 
defendant destroys that original jurisdiction. . . .  But, where original jurisdiction 
rests upon the Statute’s grant of “arising under” jurisdiction, the Court has 
assumed that the presence of a potential Eleventh Amendment bar with respect 
to one claim, has not destroyed original jurisdiction over the case. . . .  Since a 
federal court would have original jurisdiction to hear this case had Schacht 
originally filed it there, the defendants may remove the case from state to 
federal courts.  See [28 U.S.C.] § 1441(a). 
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for summary judgment) that the court recognizes as an effective 
assertion of State’s Sovereign Immunity.52 
[6] Noncitizen of State brings a federal question lawsuit against 
State in that State’s courts (or, for that matter, in some other state’s 
courts).  State removes the lawsuit to the federal district court in the 
district in which the state lawsuit was commenced.  If the Eleventh 
Amendment abrogates federal original jurisdiction with respect to 
federal question claims, then the court follows the process indicated in 
[4] above.  If the Eleventh Amendment does not implicate federal 
original jurisdiction over federal question claims, then the court 
follows the process indicated in [5] above. 
So far, so good—in Lapides, Georgia removed an action commenced 
in its own courts by one of its Citizens on federal question grounds.  
Thus, Lapides presents a scenario [5] case, which implicates Sovereign 
Immunity and not the Eleventh Amendment.  The District Court was 
entirely correct to welcome the case on its removal calendar.  If we 
admit the view that, by removing, the State consented to suit in federal 
court, then the Supreme Court was uncontroversially correct in affirming 
the District Court’s refusal to dismiss and in reversing the Court of 
Appeals’ contrary view.  Share my short-lived comfort with this nice, 
clean, unanimous Supreme Court decision. 
10.  Eleventh Amendment, Sovereign Immunity: What difference does 
it make, as long as the State always succeeds in getting a dismissal of the 
lawsuit commenced or prosecuted against it in federal court?  The 
question is an entirely legitimate one to ask, especially since States have 
almost never lost when either theory has been put in play,53 and in recent 
years the Court has overruled or severely limited several of the 
precedents in which States lost.54 
 
 52. Or, in the alternative, the federal district court posits that the act of removal 
constitutes an effective (perhaps irrevocable) consent by the State to suit in federal court 
(or, in the alternative, an effective waiver of its sovereign immunity from suit in federal 
court). 
 53. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760, 769 
(2002) (holding that sovereign immunity precluded the Federal Maritime Commission 
from adjudicating a claim against a state-run port); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 
374 (2001) (holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not subject States to 
suit in federal court).  The Eleventh Circuit correctly decided Garrett on sovereign 
immunity grounds, but the Supreme Court incorrectly decided it on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds.  But see Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899, 906 (2004) 
(rejecting State’s argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement of federal 
consent decrees entered into by state officials); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 
624 (2002) (holding that State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily 
removing case to federal court). 
 54. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999) (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)). 
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I have just suggested that one difference lies in the amount of judicial 
resources that must be spent in achieving that dismissal.  A true Eleventh 
Amendment case requires only that the federal court examine a 
Noncitizen’s lawsuit to determine (1) if a State is being sued and (2) if 
the Eleventh Amendment applies to the suit—and, if so, then immediately  
to dismiss it.  A true Sovereign Immunity case requires that the federal 
court determine (1) whether a sovereign is being sued, and (2) whether 
the sovereign manifests consent to suit—that is, to wait for a valid 
manifestation of State consent or waiver (or its opposite)—and then 
exercise its jurisdiction in continuing with or dismissing the suit 
according to the manifestation.  The reason for this difference is that, 
among all the types of lawsuits against States that fall within the Article 
III original jurisdiction of the federal courts, true Eleventh Amendment 
lawsuits fall outside the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, while 
true Sovereign Immunity lawsuits fall within the federal original 
jurisdiction. 
11.  The reason for all the confusion is that the United States Supreme 
Court often has garbled “Eleventh Amendment” and “Sovereign 
Immunity.”  Indeed, one who reads the Court’s recent decisions can 
easily begin to suspect that the Court waves perfunctorily at the Eleventh 
Amendment to provide a kind of cover for the State Sovereign Immunity 
that lurks off to its side.  All this obfuscation in a decision the State is 
about to win anyway.55 
Take the question whether non-State “sovereigns”—like foreign nations 
and Indian Tribes—are to be treated as Noncitizens for purposes of the 
Eleventh Amendment.  If they are Noncitizens, then their lawsuits 
against States lie outside the federal judicial power.  If they are 
sovereigns rather than Noncitizens, then the State they are suing has 
Sovereign Immunity to invoke.  At least in the Supreme Court, these 
lawsuits have all resulted in dismissal of proceedings against the State. 
The leading case, Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, ambiguously 
holds: (1) “foreign states” are not Noncitizens within the terms of the 
Eleventh Amendment; (2) the Eleventh Amendment erects an “absolute 
bar” to “suits against a State, without her consent, brought by citizens of 
 
 55. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE 
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 12–13 (2002) (arguing that when the 
obfuscation of Sovereign Immunity is stripped away, most of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions—which almost always favor States over individuals—lack any constitutional 
basis). 
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another State or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State”; (3) the 
Eleventh Amendment also “[s]upersed[es] the decision in Chisholm v. 
Georgia,” with result that the “‘entire judicial power granted by the 
Constitution’ does not embrace authority to entertain such suits in the 
absence of the State’s consent”; (4) the Article III exceptions to (3), that 
is, federal jurisdiction over suits between States of the United States and 
suits between the United States and one of its States, are “inherent in the 
constitutional plan” as a “necessary feature of the formation of a more 
perfect Union”; and (5) thus, State Sovereign Immunity (nonamenability 
to suit unless consented to) applies to a foreign state’s suit against a 
State.56  The meaning of the “absolute bar” passage in (2) is 
ambiguous—what sort of “absolute bar” would have a “consent” 
qualification?  It is also unnecessary to the unanimous Court’s decision 
denying Monaco leave to file its suit.57 
When the Court returns to the Monaco doctrine in a series of suits 
brought by Indian Tribes against States in federal court, it begins by 
quoting the Eleventh Amendment, then moves directly to Sovereign 
Immunity,58 and ends by authoring an incomprehensible mish-mash of 
the two otherwise distinct concepts.59  The States always win in these 
decisions.  If Indian Tribes are Noncitizens for purposes of the Eleventh 
Amendment, then the States would always win and the Indian Tribes 
would know to bring their suits against States in state court.  If Indian 
Tribes are not Noncitizens for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment 
(because they are sovereigns or, perhaps, because they are Citizens of 
the State they are suing), then their suits are covered by State Sovereign 
Immunity, an immunity the State can waive, and Indian Tribes can 
continue to take a chance on suing States in federal court.60  What stands 
 
 56. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328–32 (1934) (citations 
omitted). 
 57. Because the Monaco Court jumps tracks from Eleventh Amendment analysis 
to Sovereign Immunity analysis, its conclusion does not quite follow from its premises.  
The Court could have reached the same conclusion more quickly and clearly—without 
any dishonesty—if it had ignored the Eleventh Amendment and instead stated that the 
State retains its Sovereign Immunity and is thus exempt from suit by a foreign state (in 
the absence of certain exceptions to the exemption, such as the State’s knowing consent). 
 58. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779–82 (1991); Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55 (1996). 
 59. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267–69, 287–88 (1997). 
 60. Until the early twentieth century, it was clear that Indian Tribes were neither 
citizens of the State in which they were located, nor citizens of a foreign state.  Iowa 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987).  In 1924, Congress made all Indians 
born in the United States citizens of the United States, as well as of their respective 
states, for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.  Id. at 18 n.10 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1401).  
Nonetheless, when a Tribe sues a State, it sues as a sovereign.  Tribes also are not 
citizens of a State for diversity jurisdiction purposes.  Id.  Several circuits have wrestled 
with the question of whether a Tribe even falls within the scope of the Eleventh 
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in the way of this rather straightforward distinction between the Eleventh 
Amendment’s jurisdictional bar and the vagaries of State Sovereign 
Immunity?  Nothing, except the Supreme Court’s confusion of the two 
concepts. 
Or take the question of whether Congress can abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment in the exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment power.  Some 
may consider bizarre the Rehnquist Court’s idea that the Eleventh 
Amendment blocks Congress from abrogating State Sovereign Immunity 
by resort to its Article I powers but not from doing so by resort to its 
Fourteenth Amendment power.61  My point is that the Court’s distinction 
does not actually rest on the Eleventh Amendment; instead, it rests on 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to abrogate 
State Sovereign Immunity, and if so, then within what limits.  Fitzpatrick 
and Atascadero, the leading cases on Congress’s authority to provide 
private causes of action against States in the exercise of its Fourteenth 
Amendment power, involved Citizens as plaintiffs and were not Eleventh 
Amendment cases.62  Seminole Tribe, the first decision to broach the 
distinction between “Article I powers” and “Fourteenth Amendment powers,” 
quotes the Eleventh Amendment and then clearly spends the rest of its 
time on State Sovereign Immunity.63  (And, if what I have just said about 
the nonapplication of Eleventh Amendment to sovereigns makes sense, 
then Seminole Tribe involves not even a whisper of an Eleventh 
Amendment problem).  The State defendants win in all these cases. 
Florida Prepaid does involve an Eleventh Amendment problem, and 
the Court does seem to hold that Congress is not limited by the Eleventh 
Amendment in the exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment authority.64  
Although I wish the Court had simply ordered dismissal instead of using 
Florida Prepaid as its vehicle for declaring that State Sovereign 
Immunity was stronger than the Patent Remedy Clarification Act, my 
argument here does not depend on confession of error on this point by 
 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 
1140–41 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that Tribes were “stateless persons” but nonetheless 
within the Eleventh Amendment’s bar).  See generally Peter B. Oh, A Jurisdictional 
Approach to Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 434–35 n.201 
(2003) (discussing the complexities of tribal citizenship). 
 61. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 72–73. 
 62. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 236–38 (1985); Fitzpatrick 
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448, 455–56 (1976). 
 63. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54–73. 
 64. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 637, 646–48 (1999), aff’d, 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
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the Court.  So be it if the Fourteenth Amendment amends the terms of the 
Eleventh Amendment.  (And again, the State won in Florida Prepaid). 
12.  Did the Lapides Court have to refer to the Eleventh Amendment 
in concluding that Georgia had consented to federal jurisdiction by 
removing Lapides’ lawsuit to federal court?  Probably, out of deference 
to the parties and lower courts.  The parties had framed Georgia’s 
postremoval motion to dismiss by resort to the Eleventh Amendment.  
The parties had framed the issues on appeal with reference to the 
Eleventh Amendment.  The lower federal courts had resolved the issues 
with reference to the Eleventh Amendment.  Circuits had split in their 
attempts to answer this precise question in the shadow of the Supreme 
Court’s fluctuating jurisprudence on State Sovereign/“Eleventh 
Amendment” Immunity.  And the High Court itself had granted Lapides’ 
petition for certiorari “to decide whether ‘a state waive[s] its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity by its affirmative litigation conduct when it 
removes a case to federal court.’”65 
The short—and correct—answer to Lapides’ question is that (1) a 
State has no “Eleventh Amendment immunity” to waive, but (2) the 
State’s removal in this case did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment 
because the underlying state court proceedings had been initiated by a 
Citizen of the defendant State.  This was not the answer the Lapides 
Court provided. 
Did the Lapides Court feel the constraint of precedent in discussing 
Eleventh Amendment “immunity”?  Maybe, but it shouldn’t have.  
Although the Supreme Court precedents are numerous in which 
Sovereign Immunity problems are discussed as though they included 
Eleventh Amendment problems, the holdings that invite the Lapides 
Court’s “immunity” analysis are almost nonexistent.  The Lapides Court 
cites Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon as its example for the 
proposition that “[a] State remains free to waive its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court.”66  But Atascadero, 
like nearly all the other decisions that could have been cited for a similar 
proposition, involves a suit initiated in federal court by a Citizen against 
his own State—a Hans v. Louisiana, Sovereign Immunity case, not an 
Eleventh Amendment case. 
The Lapides Court uses Clark v. Barnard as its main stand-in for its 
proposition that “more than a century ago this Court indicated that a 
State’s voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.”67  But Clark’s “indication” was no 
 
 65. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citation omitted). 
 66. Id. at 618 (citing Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238). 
 67. Id. at 619 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)). 
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such thing.  After sidestepping the Rhode Island Treasurer’s argument 
that the federal suit brought against him was actually brought against his 
State “contrary to the Eleventh Amendment,” Clark held that Rhode 
Island’s subsequent voluntary intervention in the lawsuit amounted to a 
waiver of its sovereign immunity.68  The Eleventh Amendment was 
irrelevant to this issue because the Amendment had nothing to say about 
litigation initiated by a State in federal court, and the Massachusetts 
plaintiffs in Clark had carefully avoided suing the State of Rhode Island. 
Clark holds as much, and heads a consistent line of similar “voluntary 
appearance” or “consent” precedents, some of which refer to the 
Eleventh Amendment and some of which do not.  None of this matters, 
because, like Clark (and Lapides), these cases do not involve suits 
initiated by a Noncitizen against the State.  Regardless of any careless—and 
superfluous—language in them to the contrary, these cases either 
involve the State as the federal-court claimant or deal with problems 
implicating State Sovereign Immunity (and its waiver), not the Eleventh 
Amendment’s elimination of federal jurisdiction over suits commenced 
or prosecuted by Noncitizens against States. 
Did the Lapides Court have to refer to the Eleventh Amendment after 
it arrogantly converted the case Georgia removed on federal question 
grounds into a case devoid of federal questions?69  No.  Indeed, it had no 
legitimate business doing so.  First, Lapides was a Georgia citizen, not a 
“Citizen[] of another State,” bringing claims against Georgia; so the 
Eleventh Amendment is irrelevant to this litigation.  Second, Lapides’ 
federal claims provided the only basis for removal; if they proved so 
bogus that a court could simply dismiss them sua sponte, then one must 
wonder how Georgia could have been made to stay in federal court after 
those claims were dismissed.  After all, Article III—not the Eleventh 
Amendment—refuses to recognize federal original jurisdiction over 
nondiverse litigation involving only state law questions. 
 
 68. Clark, 108 U.S. at 447–48. 
 69. It has become clear that we must limit our answer to the context of state-law  
claims, in respect to which the State has explicitly waived immunity from 
state-court proceedings. That is because Lapides’ only federal claim against 
the State arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that claim seeks only monetary 
damages, and we have held that a state is not a “person” against whom a § 1983 
claim for money damages might be asserted. 
Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617. 
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13.  Hans, Clark, and Atascadero, then, neither contradict my argument, 
nor support the Lapides Nine.  A handful of other decisions, however, prove 
more formidable opponents.  I briefly identify and respond to them here. 
(a) New Hampshire v. Louisiana seems to be the first Supreme Court 
decision to conflate the Eleventh Amendment with Sovereign Immunity.70  
During Reconstruction, Louisiana and other Confederate States encountered 
considerable trouble in paying their debts, and passed various fiats that 
discounted or eliminated them.  In lawsuit after lawsuit brought by 
creditors, the U.S. Supreme Court supported these States’ behavior.  
New Hampshire and New York attempted to help out their own citizens 
by passing legislation under which the citizens could assign their 
Louisiana bonds and coupons to the respective States. 
With these assignments in hand, New Hampshire and New York 
commenced suit against Louisiana in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking a 
declaration that the bonds evidencing the debts were valid, that 
Louisiana was prohibited from diverting the tax funds that had been 
earmarked to pay these debts, and that the actions taken by Louisiana 
unconstitutionally impaired that State’s own obligations under its own 
contracts.  “No one can look at the pleadings and testimony in these 
cases,” a unanimous Supreme Court found, “without being satisfied, 
beyond all doubt, that they were in legal effect commenced, and are now 
prosecuted, solely by the owners of the bonds and coupons.”71  It 
followed that the Eleventh Amendment required dismissal of the suit: 
“The language of the [Eleventh] amendment is, in effect, that the judicial 
power of the United States shall not extend to any suit commenced or 
prosecuted by citizens of one State against another State.”72  But on the 
way to its judgment of dismissal, the Court also stated: 
The evident purpose of the [Eleventh] amendment, so promptly proposed and 
finally adopted, was to prohibit all suits against a State by or for citizens of 
other States, or aliens, without the consent of the State to be sued, and, in our 
opinion, one State cannot create a controversy with another State, within the 
meaning of that term as used in the judicial clauses of the Constitution, by 
assuming the prosecution of debts owing by the other State to its citizens.73 
This statement was a casual one, unaccompanied by any visible means 
of support.  The statement was gratuitous; once the Court found that 
Noncitizens rather than their State were the true plaintiffs, the terms of 
the Eleventh Amendment were sufficient to bar the suits.  Indeed, neither 
the fact nor the quality of Louisiana’s refusal to consent to the lawsuit 
was the subject of inquiry in the Court’s opinion.  And, in light of the 
 
 70. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88–91 (1883). 
 71. Id. at 89. 
 72. Id. at 88–89. 
 73. Id. at 91. 
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Court’s statement about the Eleventh Amendment’s “effect” a few 
paragraphs earlier in its opinion, the Court’s statement of the amendment’s 
“evident purpose” here proves rather vague.  This last quoted passage in 
New Hampshire v. Louisiana has seldom been treated as its holding in 
subsequent cases.74 
(b) Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury contradicts my 
argument in the following passage: “Where . . . an action is authorized 
by statute against a state officer in his official capacity and constituting 
an action against the state, the Eleventh Amendment operates to bar suit 
except in so far as the statute waives state immunity from suit.”75  
Otherwise, the decision supports my argument. 
Ford Motor, a Noncitizen of Indiana, commenced its lawsuit in 
federal district court against a State department and the members of its 
board, seeking a refund of state income taxes it had been charged for 
its sales in the State on the grounds that the tax violated the Commerce 
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  An 
Indiana statute established a procedure by which a taxpayer could 
petition the department for such a refund and authorized “suit against 
the department in any court of competent jurisdiction” in the event the 
petition was denied.76  The State’s Attorney General, apparently under 
the impression that the State’s statute authorized suit in federal court, 
successfully defended the federal action in both the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals.  After Ford Motor’s petition for certiorari had 
 
 74. Of the few Supreme Court decisions referring to New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 
most focus on when a State may invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.  For 
examples of Supreme Court opinions noting that a State may not invoke original 
jurisdiction unless it is a real party in interest see Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 7–8 
(2001); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737–39 (1981); Hawaii v. Standard Oil 
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258–59 n.12 (1972); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 
392–96 (1938); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 310 (1904); Missouri v. 
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 231–32 (1901); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900).  
Discussion of the Eleventh Amendment in these cases is limited to the statement that 
States may not circumvent the Eleventh Amendment and create original jurisdiction in 
the federal courts by suing on behalf of their citizens.  In other words, “original 
jurisdiction against a state can only be invoked by another state acting in its sovereign 
capacity,” New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 372 (1953), and discussions of New 
Hampshire tend to focus on which facts either show or belie a state’s interest as a 
sovereign in a particular suit. 
 75. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1945), overruled on other 
grounds, Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 622–23 (2002).  And again: “[The 
Eleventh Amendment] denies to the federal courts authority to entertain a suit brought by 
private parties against a state without its consent.”  Ford Motor Co., 232 U.S. at 464. 
 76. Id. at 461 n.3. 
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been granted by the Supreme Court, the State invoked the Eleventh 
Amendment as a bar to federal suit.77 
A unanimous Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remanded the action to the District Court “with directions to dismiss the 
complaint for want of consent by the state to this suit.”78  In doing so, the 
Ford Motor Court held: (1) Ford’s lawsuit “against the department and 
the individuals as the board constitutes an action against the State of 
Indiana” rather than against state officers in their individual capacity.79  
(2) Although the state statute in question authorized a lawsuit against the 
State, the authorization was “a waiver of state immunity from suit in 
state courts only,”80 and “no properly authorized executive or administrative 
officer of the state has waived the state’s immunity to suit in the federal 
courts.”81  And, most important, (3) despite having litigated the matter 
through two tiers of federal courts before invoking the Eleventh 
Amendment, the State’s invocation was timely: “The Eleventh 
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on 
federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will 
consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even 
though urged for the first time in this Court.”82 
Not all the language, but certainly all the decision, of the Court fully 
supports my argument.  A State has no authority to redefine the contours 
of the federal judicial power.  The Eleventh Amendment contours the 
federal judicial power to exclude Noncitizens’ suits against States in 
federal court.  That the lower federal courts and the parties in Ford 
Motor had neglected these truths (until reaching the Supreme Court) did 
not abrogate these truths.  The Supreme Court’s vacation following 
order of dismissal of the lower courts’ decisions, upon discovery of the 
error, is entirely consistent with the Eleventh Amendment’s text. 
(c) At first glance, the two College Savings Bank cases contradict my 
argument.  A New Jersey corporation commenced two lawsuits in New 
Jersey’s U.S. District Court against a Florida state agency, claiming 
patent infringement in one suit and unfair competition in violation of 
federal law in the other.  In the patent infringement case, the Court 
 
 77. “The objection to petitioner’s suit as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment 
was first made and argued by Indiana in this Court.”  Id. at 467. 
 78. Id. at 470. 
 79. Id. at 463.  “Petitioner’s right to maintain this action in federal court depends, 
first, upon whether the action is against the State of Indiana or against an individual.”  Id. 
at 462. 
 80. Id. at 465 (citing the Court’s construction of a “similar provision of an 
Oklahoma tax refund statute” in Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944)). 
 81. Id. at 469 (the penultimate statement concluding the Court’s analysis on pages 
467–68). 
 82. Id. at 467. 
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quoted the Eleventh Amendment, transited immediately to State 
Sovereign Immunity, reiterated that Congress had limited authority 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate State Sovereign Immunity 
(probably also the Eleventh Amendment), and held that Congress’s 
attempt in the Patent Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 to abrogate State 
Sovereign Immunity (possibly also the Eleventh Amendment) was 
unsuccessful.83 
In the unfair competition case, the Court held that “the sovereign 
immunity of the State of Florida was neither validly abrogated by the 
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the 
State’s activities in interstate commerce,” and therefore that “the federal 
courts are without jurisdiction to entertain this suit against an arm of the 
State of Florida.”84  The holding seems at least marginally nonsensical, 
because “sovereign immunity” is not a doctrine about jurisdiction in the 
usual sense.  The point here is that College Savings Bank could be a decision 
about the Eleventh Amendment, but seems much more comprehensible 
as a decision about the implied constitutional doctrine of State Sovereign 
Immunity established in Hans v. Louisiana.  Thus, reference to Eleventh 
Amendment practically disappears after the third paragraph of the 
Court’s decision.  The decision’s second paragraph begins with allusion 
to Chisholm v. Georgia and the reaction that led to the Eleventh 
Amendment, followed by this passage: 
Though its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits brought 
against one State by citizens of another State or foreign state, we have long 
recognized that the Eleventh Amendment accomplished much more: It 
repudiated the central premise of Chisholm that the jurisdictional heads of 
Article III superseded the sovereign immunity that the States possessed 
before entering the Union.  This has been our understanding of the 
Amendment since the landmark case of Hans v. Louisiana . . . . 
   While this immunity from suit is not absolute, we have recognized only 
two circumstances in which an individual may sue a State.  First, Congress 
may authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment—an Amendment enacted after the Eleventh 
Amendment and specifically designed to alter the federal-state balance.  
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer . . . .  Second, a State may waive its sovereign 
 
 83. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 634–37, 639–40 (1999).  The suggestion in this case is that the Court may be 
starting to revisit the idea that the Eleventh Amendment precludes federal question as well as 
diversity cases; or put differently, that diversity cases are covered by the Eleventh 
Amendment (and by Sovereign Immunity in the absence of the Eleventh Amendment), 
while federal question cases of all sorts are covered by State Sovereign Immunity. 
 84. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 691 (1999). 
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immunity by consenting to suit.  Clark v. Barnard . . . .  This case turns on 
whether either of these two circumstances is present.85 
The College Savings Bank Court, which abrogated the “constructive 
consent” doctrine as an exception to State Sovereign Immunity,86 seems 
to have understood and respected the argument I am making here.  My 
evidence supporting this inference comes from the court’s footnote in 
response to the dissent: 
It is difficult to square JUSTICE BREYER’s reliance upon the distinction that 
the present case involves a federal question (and is therefore not explicitly 
covered by the Eleventh Amendment) . . . with its professed fidelity to Hans, 
the whole point of which was that the sovereign immunity reflected in (rather 
than created by) the Eleventh Amendment transcends the narrow text of the 
Amendment itself.87 
In any event, the two College Savings Bank decisions turn out not to 
impair my argument, but rather to strengthen it by eliminating one set of 
possible exceptions (Congress’s power to abrogate the Amendment 
under Article I, and the “constructive consent” doctrine) and by severely 
 
 85. Id. at 669–70 (citations omitted).  None of the precedents cited in these two 
paragraphs is an Eleventh Amendment case.  I have discussed Hans, Fitzpatrick, and 
Clark previously in this article.  The other cases cited in this passage are Ex parte New 
York, 256 U.S. 490, 496–98 (1921) (action by citizen against State; State Sovereign 
Immunity bars a plaintiff’s admiralty claim in federal court against an unconsenting 
State); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330–32 (1934) (although the 
Eleventh Amendment only bars suits by individual Noncitizens against States, State 
Sovereign Immunity bars suits brought by foreign sovereigns in federal court against 
unconsenting States); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 
(1984) (action by Citizens against State; State Sovereign Immunity bars the assertion of 
federal question claims in federal court against unconsenting States): 
   The Amendment’s language overruled the particular result in Chisholm, but 
this Court has recognized that its greater significance lies in its affirmation that 
the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial 
authority in Art. III . . . .  In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a 
constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III. 
Id.; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 44–45 (1996) (involving action by Citizen or 
sovereign against State; neither the Eleventh Amendment nor State Sovereign Immunity 
can be unilaterally abrogated by Congress in the exercise of its Article I Commerce Power). 
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article 
III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, “we have understood the 
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition . . . which it confirms.” . . .  For over a century we have reaffirmed 
that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States “was not 
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the 
United States.”  Hans . . . .   
Id. at 54. 
 86. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676–87 (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 
U.S. 184 (1964)).  As the majority obliquely points out, most if not all of the Eleventh 
Amendment’s piece of the “constructive waiver” doctrine had already been eliminated 
by Seminole Tribe.  Id. 
 87. Id. at 687–88 n.5 (emphasis added). 
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limiting the other possible exception (Congress’s power to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
Hardly any of the language in these decisions, and none of their results, 
contradict my argument for the independence of the Eleventh 
Amendment’s jurisdictional bar from the defense of State Sovereign 
Immunity. 
14.  I now confront four problems that are more substantive in character 
for my textualist view of the Eleventh Amendment, and for my thesis on 
the separation of Eleventh Amendment from State Sovereign Immunity. 
The Eleventh Amendment and Interstate Compacts.  A few cases, led 
by Petty v. Tennessee–Missouri Bridge Commission, hold that Congress 
does not behave unconstitutionally when it conditions its approval of an 
Interstate Compact on relinquishment by the Compact’s State members 
of their sovereign immunity.88  Assuming these precedents continue to 
state the law, I am not troubled in reconciling them with the Eleventh 
Amendment.  These cases all seem to involve a victim’s suit for 
damages or compensation against an interstate commission or board.89  
From appearances, the victim seems to be a Citizen of one of the State 
members to the Compact.90  No matter—Interstate Compacts do not 
create new States, and suit against a multistate commission doesn’t have 
to be construed as suit against any particular State. 
If, nonetheless, the Eleventh Amendment is understood to foreclose 
damages actions against multistate Compacts, then only actions brought 
in the federal courts would be foreclosed.  On my view, Congress has no 
power to negotiate a State’s waiver of the Eleventh Amendment (at least, 
not in the exercise of its Article I powers), but it does have power to 
negotiate a State’s waiver of its sovereign immunity.  As a result of such 
a deal, the courts of Compact States would be made available for redress 
of injuries—as well as the federal courts, at least for a federal question 
lawsuit by a Citizen against the Compact member that is his or her State. 
 
 88. Petty v. Tenn.–Mo. Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). 
 89. See, e.g., Hess v. Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994) 
(involving suit for damages brought by injured railroad employees); Port Auth. Trans–
Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 301 (1990) (involving suit by injured railroad 
employees).  In both cases the railroad was owned and operated by the states of New 
Jersey and New York. 
 90. Neither Hess nor Feeney mention the citizenship of the railroad workers; 
however, it seems likely that they resided in either New York or New Jersey as they 
worked on a railroad that went between the two.  See Hess, 513 U.S. at 33; Feeney, 495 
U.S. at 301. 
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State as Plaintiff, Noncitizen as Counterclaimant.  The Eleventh 
Amendment does not speak to States as litigation commencers or 
prosecutors.  Sometimes States bring suit against Noncitizens in federal 
court.  Does the Eleventh Amendment preclude these defendant Noncitizens 
from counterclaiming against the plaintiff States?  Answering this question 
cannot legitimately depend on considerations of “efficiency in litigation” 
or on the extent to which worship of transaction/occurrence civil 
litigation demands the presence of compulsory (but not permissive) 
counterclaims.91  The answer does seem to depend on the depth of the 
principle, quoted by the Lapides Court, that “where a State voluntarily 
becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial 
determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the result of 
its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh 
Amendment.”92  Lapides, however, does not involve a Noncitizen, and 
thus is not an Eleventh Amendment case. 
The Eleventh Amendment does not tell us whether filing a counterclaim 
is the equivalent of commencing a lawsuit.  If assertion of a counterclaim 
amounts to “commencement or prosecution” of a “suit,” then the Noncitizen 
defendant’s counterclaim is barred from the original jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.  If not, then the issue goes away for the Eleventh 
Amendment and remains an issue for the Sovereign Immunity doctrine 
that a State cannot be sued without its consent (“voluntarily becom[ing] 
a party to a cause and submit[ting] its rights for judicial determination”).93  
 
 91. Federal courts have confronted problems that threaten transaction/occurrence-
based litigation, and have resolved them in favor of honoring the limits of their 
jurisdiction.  For example, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims 
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  The plaintiff who brings state 
securities fraud claims against a nondiverse defendant in the state courts, and a parallel 
Rule 10b-5 claim against the same defendant in federal district court, is understood to be 
entitled to maintain both lawsuits.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 
(1996). 
 92. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002) (quoting Gunter v. Atl. 
Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906)).  In Gunter, South Carolina filed a suit 
in federal district court to collect taxes against a Noncitizen railroad.  The State lost and 
was enjoined from taxing the railroad.  Over ten years later, a successor bought the 
railroad and South Carolina filed a suit in state court to collect taxes from the successor.  
While the state prosecution was pending, the railroad sought and obtained a federal 
injunction against the attorney general of South Carolina from prosecuting the case, 
based on res judicata.  This second injunction was filed as an ancillary case to the 
original suit from ten years before.  The State claimed that the injunction violated the 
Eleventh Amendment because the attorney general represented the State’s interests (by 
legislative authorization).  Gunter, 200 U.S. at 277–82. The court held: (1) the attorney 
general was not the State; (2) to the extent that the State was really a party, the Eleventh 
Amendment did not bar the suit because the original action—from ten years before—had 
been commenced by the State.  Id. at 273–74.  For this second holding, Gunter relied on 
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).  Id. at 284.  For discussion of Clark, see supra 
notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 93. Gunter, 200 U.S. at 284; see also Clark, 108 U.S. at 447–48 (dismissing the 
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In any event, relegating a Noncitizen defendant’s claim to the state 
courts for its prosecution—with only a “set off” or some other defensive 
version of the claim admitted in federal court—would not signal the end 
of the world, or even the end of an otherwise compulsory counterclaim.94 
Negotiated Waiver or Consent.  In recent decisions, the Supreme Court 
has indicated that States can negotiate away their “Eleventh Amendment 
immunity” and, accordingly, be deemed to have “consented” to suit in 
federal court, in return for the receipt of Congress’s largess.  Then, in 
one contentious decision after another, the Court has whittled away at 
the concept of State “consent,” has demanded ever increasing evidence 
of State consent, and has insisted on ever clearer manifestation of 
congressional intent to extract State consent.95  During this period, the 
State defendants have never been made to stay in federal court in the 
lawsuits paying lip service to this principle.  Indeed, only two of these 
cases involved Noncitizen plaintiffs and thus fell within the terms of the 
Eleventh Amendment.96  The decisions in these two cases, as well as in 
all the other cases dating back to Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 
have fostered considerable tension between Congress and the Supreme 
Court.97 
The two College Savings Bank decisions, and not Atascadero, are the 
most problematic pre-Lapides decisions for my argument.  Once the 
 
Eleventh Amendment claim immediately and moving into a discussion of whether 
sovereign immunity bars the case). 
 94. Indeed, Justice Breyer—who authored the Lapides opinion—seems to have 
made this point in Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht: 
[W]here original jurisdiction rests upon the Statute’s grant of “arising under” 
jurisdiction, the Court has assumed that the presence of a potential Eleventh 
Amendment bar with respect to one claim, has not destroyed original 
jurisdiction over the case . . . .  Since a federal court would have original 
jurisdiction to hear this case had Schacht originally filed it there, the defendants 
may remove the case from state to federal courts.  See [28 U.S.C.] § 1441(a). 
524 U.S. 381, 389–90 (1998) (citations omitted). 
 95. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985); South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–12 (1987); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and 
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 474–74 (1987); Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305–06; Coll. Sav. Bank v. 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627, 675–87 (1999), aff’d, 527 
U.S. 666 (1999). 
 96. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 670–71; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 630. 
 97. Immediately after the two College Savings Bank decisions, members of 
Congress set about to overturn them.  Bills to that effect have been introduced repeatedly 
in Congress since 2000.  See, e.g., Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 
2002, S. 2031, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002) (introduced by Senators Leahy and Brownback, 
March 19, 2002). 
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proposition is accepted that the Eleventh Amendment applies to 
Noncitizens’ federal question claims, as well as to their diversity claims 
against a State,98 they fall clearly within the terms of the Amendment’s 
barricade against federal original jurisdiction.  On my argument, they 
should have been dismissed sua sponte by the district court—but for 
sloppy precedents on “Congress’s abrogation of Eleventh Amendment” 
and “State constructive waiver.”  As I previously pointed out, the 
Supreme Court used the two College Savings Bank decisions to overrule 
those precedents.  The references to “Eleventh Amendment immunity” 
in the College Savings Bank decisions contradict the argument I am 
making here, as do the parties’ and federal courts’ efforts and expense in 
enabling these decisions, but the results in these decisions do not. 
Congress and the States might well control the contours of State 
Sovereign Immunity.  Congress may well be able to exact a State’s 
waiver of sovereign immunity in return for extension of the federal 
government’s benefits.  If a State abides by its bargain, it will offer its 
own courts for redress of claims regarding those benefits, and will 
submit to suits by its own Citizens commenced and prosecuted in federal 
district court.  (I note in passing that States seldom are required to 
provide, for example, federal employment or welfare benefits to 
Noncitizens).  If a State reneges on the bargain it is constitutionally 
authorized to make, then the United States can sue it in federal court, or 
can withdraw the benefits it has conditioned on waiver.  In these 
bargaining situations, however, neither Congress nor the States should 
legitimately be understood to control the contours of the Eleventh 
Amendment, because the Amendment does not offer “immunity,” but 
rather removes a class of lawsuits from the original jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. 
15.  Lapides involved none of Eleventh Amendment problems I have 
just discussed.  Indeed, a properly understood Lapides does not involve 
the Eleventh Amendment at all.  The case does, however, involve 
removal by the State of claims originally commenced against it in its 
own courts.  And the case, in treating the Eleventh Amendment as 
though it equaled State Sovereign Immunity—that is, that “[a] State 
remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a 
federal court”99—clearly holds that a State is entitled to avail itself of the 
federal removal jurisdiction in lawsuits brought against it in its own 
courts.  If Lapides means what it so clearly says in the context of a 
Citizen’s action against his State in his State’s courts, then “Eleventh 
 
 98. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 476–88 
(1987); see supra section 3, pages 6–10. 
 99. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 618. 
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Amendment equals waivable State Sovereign Immunity” must apply to 
Noncitizen suits as well as to Citizen suits.  (After all, the Eleventh 
Amendment actually mentions Noncitizen suits; it says nothing about 
Citizen suits). 
A good general proposition is that a lawsuit commenced in state court 
is removable to federal courts if the lawsuit, as it looks when the 
removal occurs, could have been commenced in federal court in the first 
place.100  So let’s make Lapides an Alabama citizen, instead of the 
Georgia citizen he actually was.  Noncitizen Lapides sues Georgia in a 
proper Georgia state court.  Under these circumstances, defendant Georgia 
may remove the suit to federal district court if Lapides is asserting a 
federal claim against it.  That is so because “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.”101  Removal, though voluntary on 
Georgia’s part, does not make Georgia the plaintiff and Lapides the 
defendant in the federal action.  Alabama Lapides did not commence his 
action in federal court, but, upon Georgia’s removal of the action to “the 
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 
the place where such action is pending,”102 he will be the Noncitizen 
who is prosecuting his federal question “suit in law or equity” against a 
State in apparent contradiction of the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.  
No matter, because, according to a unanimous United States Supreme 
Court decision, the Eleventh Amendment does not mean what it says; 
instead, it means waivable State Sovereign Immunity. 
Georgia might not be able to remove Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit if it 
asserts only state law claims.  That is so because the removal statute 
states that such lawsuits “shall be removable only if none of the parties 
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the 
State in which such action is brought.”103  At this point, the question 
becomes whether a State, as a defendant sued in its own courts on 
nonfederal claims, is a citizen of itself for purposes of removal.  The 
Lapides Court seems to indicate that a State is not a citizen of itself for 
this purpose, because it unanimously allowed the state claims Lapides 
was prosecuting against Georgia to remain in the district court after 
effectively dismissing his bogus federal claim: 
 
 100. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) & 1446(b) (2000). 
 101. Id. § 1331. 
 102. Id. § 1441(a). 
 103. Id. § 1441(b). 
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[T]his case does not present a valid federal claim against the State. . . .  
Nonetheless, Lapides’ state-law tort claims against the State remain pending in 
Federal District Court . . . and the law commits the remand question, ordinarily a 
matter of discretion, to the Federal District Court for decision in the first instance. . . .  
Hence, the question presented is not moot.  We possess the legal power here to 
answer that question as limited to the state-law context just described.104 
So far we have been working through Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit as 
though he had initiated it in Georgia’s state courts.  The Lapides analysis, 
however, does not require the complications of a removal step; it only 
requires a State to engage in an effective waiver of its Eleventh 
Amendment equals Sovereign Immunity.  Removal is permitted only of 
lawsuits, commenced in state court “of which the district courts of the 
United States have original jurisdiction.”105  Therefore, in permitting 
removal by Georgia of Georgia Lapides’ lawsuit, Lapides must hold, 
contrary to the text of the Eleventh Amendment, that the federal district 
courts have original jurisdiction of Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit, subject 
only to Georgia’s waiver or consent. 
According to the Lapides analysis, then, Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit, 
expressing federal claims against Georgia, clearly can be commenced in 
federal district court.  How about Alabama Lapides’ lawsuit expressing only 
state claims against Georgia?  Here, although we have clear diversity—the 
same diversity as that involved in Chisholm v. Georgia—we may 
encounter difficulty.  That is so because the original diversity jurisdiction of 
the federal district courts is defined by a statute that, in keeping with 
what almost everyone thought the Eleventh Amendment said before 
Lapides, does not specifically provide for a Noncitizen’s civil action 
against a State.106  And thus, the implication in Lapides that a State is not 
a citizen of itself, latent in the Court’s decision to leave the action the 
State removed in the district court when only state claims remained, 
must extend at least this far: 
(1) Contrary to what it seems to say, the Eleventh Amendment 
does not serve to contour the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  
Instead, it simply gives States an immunity from suit in federal court 
that a State is free to waive. 
 
 104. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617–18. 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens 
of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different 
States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; 
and (4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different 
States. 
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(2) Contrary to what it seems to say, the Eleventh Amendment 
makes no distinction between Citizens and Noncitizens for purposes 
of federal original jurisdiction of their lawsuits against States. 
(3) Lawsuits including federal claims lie within the original 
jurisdiction of the federal district courts and can be commenced 
against States by Noncitizens and Citizens alike in either federal or 
state court, and prosecuted there so long as the State consents to suit 
or otherwise effectively waives its Sovereign Immunity. 
(4) Lawsuits including federal claims against States and 
commenced in state courts can be removed by States to federal 
district court and thereafter can be prosecuted in federal courts by 
Noncitizens and Citizens alike.  And this is so even after the federal 
claims have been dismissed postremoval and only state claims 
remain.  A State’s act of removal is one of the ways a State waives 
its Sovereign Immunity. 
(5) By virtue of the federal diversity jurisdiction statute, lawsuits 
that include only state claims against States do not fall within the 
original jurisdiction of the federal district courts, and therefore can 
neither be commenced by Noncitizens or Citizens in, nor removed by 
States to, federal district court. 
Of course, with respect to proposition (5), the federal diversity 
jurisdiction statute is subject to modification by Congress within the 
limits set by Article III of the U.S. Constitution.  And thus, 
(6) Congress is free to amend the federal diversity jurisdiction 
statute to authorize federal district courts to entertain suits involving only 
state law claims and commenced by Noncitizens against States, with 
the requirement that the State must consent to suit or otherwise 
effectively waive its Sovereign Immunity.  Congress could amend the 
same statute (or the removal statute) to authorize federal district courts 
to entertain diversity suits commenced by Noncitizens against States and 
removed by States to federal district court.  And, beyond what has 
been said so far, the Eleventh Amendment has nothing more to say 
about these possibilities. 
16.  Perhaps our guess will be comfortable, after Lapides, that Congress 
will not amend the federal diversity jurisdiction statute to give the 
federal district courts original jurisdiction of Noncitizens’ state lawsuits 
commenced against States and expressing only nonfederal claims, with 
the vagaries of State Sovereign Immunity (and its waiver) doing the 
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work of what the Eleventh Amendment might have been supposed 
crisply and cleanly to have been doing.  But federal district court original 
jurisdiction is not the only original jurisdiction within the federal judicial 
power.  And here is where the Lapides decision turns from risky to 
explosive. 
A Supreme Court that unmoors the Eleventh Amendment from its text 
and says “a State remains free to waive its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suit in a federal court,” one hopes, has taken full account 
of itself.  That is so because Article III quite clearly states: “In all 
Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction.”107  And a State “free to waive its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity” surely must be as free to waive it in actions 
commenced against the State in the United States Supreme Court as in 
actions commenced against the State in the federal district courts.  
Indeed, the road to the Eleventh Amendment started with Chisholm v. 
Georgia, an original proceeding in the United States Supreme Court. 
Speaking of Chisholm, we do well to remember that Justice Iredell’s 
dissent had two main parts to it, one of which seems generally to have 
been ignored in the bashing Chisholm has taken since Hans v. Louisiana.  
Iredell argued that regardless of the terms of Article III of the 
Constitution, State Sovereign Immunity had not been abrogated by them.  
He also argued that regardless of the terms of Article III, the enablement 
of those terms was up to Congress, and Congress had not enabled the 
terms to abrogate State Sovereign Immunity. 
   I have now, I think, established the following particulars. 1st.  That the 
Constitution, so far as it respects the judicial authority, can only be carried into 
effect by acts of the Legislature appointing Courts, and prescribing their 
methods of proceeding.  2d.  That Congress has provided no new law in regard 
to this case, but expressly referred us to the old.  3d.  That there are no 
principles of the old law, to which we must have recourse, that in any manner 
authorise the present suit, either by precedent or by analogy.  The consequence 
of which, in my opinion, clearly is, that the suit in question cannot be 
maintained, nor, of course, the motion made upon it be complied with.108 
Although the Supreme Court has applauded Iredell’s treatise on the 
sovereignty of the States, it has jealously guarded its Article III original 
jurisdiction against any notion that Congress might alter it.109  Thus, 
 
 107. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 108. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
 109. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 395–97 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring): 
[This case raises] a grave constitutional question: namely, whether Congress 
constitutionally can impose remedial limitations so jurisdictional in nature that 
they effectively withdraw the original jurisdiction of this Court. 
   . . . In its broadest textual delegation, [Article III] authorizes Congress to 
establish the “inferior Courts” and places no express limits on the 
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unless saved by the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction extends to all suits between Noncitizens and States in law or 
equity, whether federal question or simple diversity, subject to a 
defendant State’s assertion, case by case, of Sovereign Immunity.  So 
says Lapides. 
We may not feel too badly about the federal question lawsuits that are 
filed within the High Court’s original jurisdiction, because the Court has 
devised means for shuttling them off to lower federal courts.110  And 
 
congressional power to regulate the courts so created.  See U.S. Const., Art. 
III, § 1, cl. 1.  By contrast, that Article itself creates the Supreme Court and 
textually differentiates between Congress’ relationship with the appellate and 
original jurisdictions of that Court. . . .  U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 . . . . 
   Though the original history of Art. III is sparse, what is available indicates 
that these textual differences were purposeful on the Framers’ part.  The 
Framers obviously thought that the National Government should have a 
judicial system of its own [with its own] Supreme Court.  However, because 
the Framers believed the state courts would be adequate for resolving most 
disputes, they generally left Congress the power of determining what cases, if 
any, should be channelled to the federal courts.  The one textual exception to 
that rule concerned the original jurisdiction, where the Framers apparently 
mandated that Supreme Court review be available.  “The evident purpose was 
to open and keep open the highest court of the nation for the determination, in 
the first instance, of suits involving a State or a diplomatic or commercial 
representative of a foreign government.”  Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 464 
(1884). . . .  [S]ee also The Federalist No. 81, pp. 507–509 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) 
(A. Hamilton).  Perhaps more importantly, the Framers also thought that the 
original jurisdiction was a necessary substitute for the powers of war and 
diplomacy that these sovereigns previously had relied upon.  See Georgia v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945); United States v. Texas, 143 
U.S. 621, 641 (1892).  “The Supreme Court [was] given higher standing than 
any known tribunal, both by the nature of its rights and the categories subject 
to its jurisdiction,”  A. de Toqueville, Democracy in America, p. 149 (J. Mayer 
ed. 1969) (emphasis in original), precisely to keep sovereign nations and States 
from using force “to rebuff the exaggerated pretensions of the Union . . . .”  Id. 
at 150. 
Id. at 395–97; accord California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979) (per curiam) (“The 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred not by the Congress but by the 
Constitution itself.  This jurisdiction is self-executing, and needs no legislative 
implementation.”) (citations omitted); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 101 
n.2 (1972) (noting that Congress may provide for or deny alternate forums to the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction).  See generally, James E. Pfander, Rethinking the 
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555 
(1994). 
 110. The Supreme Court exercises discretion over whether to hear cases that fall 
within its original jurisdiction, and even over those falling within its exclusive original 
jurisdiction.  For examples of such discretion see United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 
538 (1973) (per curiam); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497–99 
(1971); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983); California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 
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perhaps we ought not feel too badly for the diversity lawsuits we can 
now expect to see filed originally in the Supreme Court—even though, 
as I have shown in discussing the statutory diversity jurisdiction of the 
district courts, no apparent device is available for the Court to rid itself 
of this trial caseload.111 
Where was Chief Justice Rehnquist when Lapides came along: he who 
so carefully, in Seminole Tribe, bowed to the Eleventh Amendment’s 
text and then distanced the Amendment that offered text from the 
Sovereign Immunity that did the work?112  Where was Justice Kennedy, 
who so painstakingly in Alden v. Maine distinguished actions initiated in 
State court from actions falling within the Eleventh Amendment?113  
 
164, 168 (1982) (per curiam); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 739 (1981); Arizona 
v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 796–98 (1976) (per curiam).  But see Cohens v. Virginia, 
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We have no more right to decline the exercise of 
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”). 
 111. See Maryland, 451 U.S. at 769 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in a suit between 
States brought originally in the Supreme Court): 
   The exercise of original jurisdiction in this case is particularly inappropriate 
since the issues the plaintiff States would have us decide not only can be, but 
in fact are being, litigated in other forums.  Although this case would come 
within our original and exclusive jurisdiction if appropriate, the question 
whether it is appropriate depends in part on the availability of alternative 
forums. 
Id.  This passage goes, not to whether the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of a 
claim between States, but rather to whether the Supreme Court should exercise the 
original jurisdiction it clearly has.  If the Eleventh Amendment equals State Sovereign 
Immunity, as Lapides seems clearly to say, then Justice Rehnquist will have ample 
opportunity to craft similar dissents in auto accident cases commenced by Noncitizens 
against States in the United States Supreme Court, after States waive their “Eleventh 
Amendment immunity” and ask for trial by special master.   
  One might imagine that another “appropriate forum”—the state courts—present 
themselves for these diversity claims commenced in the Supreme Court, and that the 
Court can simply transfer such an action to the state court it deems appropriate.  But we 
must also imagine that if Congress cannot commandeer a State’s courts for the 
entertainment of claims against that State, then neither can the Supreme Court.  See 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 753–54 (1999): 
The text of Article III, § 1, which extends federal judicial power to enumerated 
classes of suits but grants Congress discretion whether to establish inferior 
federal courts, does give strong support to the inference that state courts may 
be opened to suits falling within the federal judicial power.  The Article in no 
way suggests, however, that state courts may be required to assume 
jurisdiction that could not be vested in the federal courts and forms no part of 
the judicial power of the United States. 
   . . . . 
   In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, 
we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, 
an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation. 
 112. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.); see 
also Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Maryland v. Louisiana quoted and discussed supra 
note 111. 
 113. We have . . . sometimes referred to the States’ immunity from suit as  
“Eleventh Amendment immunity.”  The phrase is convenient shorthand but 
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Where was Justice Scalia, who went out of his way in College Savings 
Bank to tell Justice Breyer that Hans v. Louisiana was a Sovereign 
Immunity and not an Eleventh Amendment decision?114  Were these, and 
perhaps other Justices as well, so interested in displaying consensus that 
they compromised their earlier views?  Have they changed their minds 
about the distance between the Eleventh Amendment’s text and the 
various Sovereign Immunity/Consent and Congressional Abrogation 
doctrines they have been fighting over for the last two decades?  Or were 
they asleep at the switch when this easy little cert petition rolled across 
their desks? 
Let’s find out.  How many straight diversity actions arise every year in 
which a Noncitizen has claims against one of the fifty States or its 
ubiquitous agencies?  Maybe a thousand—vehicular accidents, tax 
disputes, bond revisions, breaches of leases or contracts, runarounds at 
the Office of the Secretary of State—maybe more?  I am guessing that 
hundreds of litigators reading this article would love to hook up with one 
or two of these claimants and attempt to commence and prosecute 
Noncitizen v. State before the United States Supreme Court.  I suspect 
that many a State would realize how much the public fisc could be 
spared if, instead of litigating a Noncitizen’s claims (for which it had 
already waived its sovereign immunity) from tier to tier in its own 
agencies and courts, it simply started at the top by consenting to such a 
Noncitizen’s suit commenced against it in the Supreme Court. 
Before Lapides, the Supreme Court could join all those federal district 
courts in pointing to the Eleventh Amendment’s text and then sua sponte 
casting these Noncitizen-against-State lawsuits from its original jurisdiction 
docket.  After Lapides, the Court will have to docket the Noncitizen’s 
complaint, see to service upon the State, and wait for a sign that the State 
has exercised its “freedom to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity” 
from suit commenced in the United States Supreme Court. 
 
something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither 
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.  Rather, 
as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations 
by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental 
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the 
Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their 
admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except 
as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments. 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). 
 114. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 687–88 n.5 (1999). 
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My invitation here is not entirely a playful one.  I think that a 
contemporary Chisholm v. Georgia may provide the only sure way to 
find out whether a unanimous Supreme Court in Lapides v. Board of 
Regents meant what it said about the waivability of the Eleventh 
Amendment’s jurisdictional barricade—a barricade that, I hope it soon 
discovers, was designed as much for its own protection as for the 
protection of the federalism the current Court is striving so hard to 
nurture. 
 
